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Case Comment
ASSESSING MENTAL CAPACITY
BUV V BUU
[2019] SGHCF 15
The assessment of the mental capacity of an elderly person 
(“P”) is central to the framework under the Mental Capacity 
Act (Cap  177A, 2010 Rev Ed). This case note discusses the 
clinical diagnosis and functional aspects of mental capacity 
and evidence needed to assess P’s mental capacity; the 
importance of examining the functional abilities for particular 
decisions to be made and how they are applied to P’s decision 
to execute legal documents; the extent to which assistance 
may be provided to P to make decisions; and the impact of 
undue influence on mental capacity.
Gary CHAN Kok Yew1
LLB (Hons), MA (National University of Singapore), 
MA (Birmingham), LLM, BA (University of London); 
Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University.
I. Introduction
1 Litigation under the Mental Capacity Act2 (“MCA”) has 
oftentimes arisen from a potent amalgam of factors: (a)  an elderly 
person (“P”) suffering from dementia or other mental illness; (b) who 
had decided to create a lasting power of attorney (“LPA”) and/or dispose 
of substantial property or assets; and (c)  family members who were 
unhappy about P’s decisions and/or personal well-being. At the centre 
of the legal maelstrom may lie a question as to P’s mental capacity at 
the time of decision-making. Is there a clear approach to ascertain the 
effect of mental incapacity on such decision-making? To what extent is 
P’s mental capacity to be determined by medical or legal experts or both? 
How does the alleged mental incapacity affect the decisions made or legal 
documents that may have been executed by P?
1 The author would like to thank Ms Athelia Ong Kai Qi, law student in the Singapore 
Management University, for her research assistance as well as the anonymous referee 
for the perceptive comments.
2 Cap 177A, 2010 Rev Ed. The statute came into effect in 2010.
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2 In BUV v BUU,3 UWP (“the second defendant”) was already 
89 years old at the time the legal actions were initiated. She was assessed 
by doctors to be suffering from dementia, had no formal education and 
was illiterate. However, she was able to understand and speak in the 
Teochew dialect. UWP apparently favoured her second son (“the first 
defendant”) at the expense of the third son (plaintiff) and his wife. In 
2016, she had executed an LPA authorising the first defendant as her 
donee to make decisions in relation to her personal welfare, property 
and financial matters. In the same year, UWP executed a will which 
bequeathed moneys to the first defendant amongst others but nothing to 
the plaintiff.
3 The litigation involved a previous court order relating to some 
moneys held in a bank account as well as an application under the MCA 
for a declaration that UWP was unable to make decisions as to her 
personal welfare, property and financial affairs and for the appointment 
of court deputies to act on her behalf. There is also a related application 
for a court order that UWP was not mentally capable of conducting 
litigation.
4 The Singapore High Court was faced with two main issues: 
(a)  whether the second defendant was mentally incapable of making 
decisions as to her personal welfare and property and to conduct litigation; 
and (b) whether the LPA and will respectively ought to be revoked. Upon 
considering a wide range of medical and non-medical evidence adduced 
by the parties, Aedit Abdullah J answered both questions affirmatively. 
His Honour also appointed two joint deputies, namely, UWP’s youngest 
daughter and daughter-in-law, to make decisions as to UWP’s property 
and financial matters including the moneys in the bank account.
5 The decision raises the following challenging issues on the 
assessment of mental capacity:
(a) the clinical diagnosis and functional aspects of mental 
capacity and evidence needed to assess P’s mental capacity;
(b) the importance of examining the functional abilities for 
particular decisions to be made and how they are applied to P’s 
decision to execute the legal documents;
(c) the extent to which assistance may be provided to P to 
make decisions; and
(d) the impact of undue influence on mental capacity.
3 [2019] SGHCF 15.
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II. Clinical and functional assessment of mental capacity
6 The statute makes an assumption that P possesses mental capacity 
and it is for the party arguing otherwise to show that P is mentally 
incapable.4 The test for mental capacity under the MCA requires the 
ascertainment of the clinical (ie, the impairment or disturbance in the 
functioning of the mind or brain) as well as the functional component 
(ie, the inability to make a decision). With respect to the functional 
component, the individual is not mentally capable of making a decision 
if he is unable to (a) understand the information relevant to the decision; 
(b)  retain that information; (c)  use or weigh that information; or 
(d) communicate her decision.5 If P lacks any one of these competencies, 
she will be adjudged to be mentally incapable of making a decision.6 
Further, it must be shown that P’s functional inability to make the 
decision was due to her mental impairment (causal nexus).7
7 In the present case, the medical experts in BUV v BUU agreed 
that UWP suffered from dementia. One medical expert assessed the 
dementia to be of mild-moderate severity whilst another expert described 
the dementia as mild and of the Alzheimer’s type.8 The learned judge 
stated that UWP had an impairment or disturbance in the functioning 
of her mind.9 His Honour also referred to UWP’s memory retention 
impairment and her inability to make judgments or solve problems.10
8 As for the functional component, Abdullah J noted UWP’s 
lack of memory and inability to follow proceedings and understand 
questions from counsel11 notwithstanding allowances due to the “stresses 
of a court environment”.12 UWP’s “lapses in memory and deficiencies in 
comprehension” were “serious”13 according to the learned judge. UWP 
could not recall the nature and contents of the legal documents she had 
4 Mental Capacity Act (Cap 177A, 2010 Rev Ed) s 3.
5 Mental Capacity Act (Cap 177A, 2010 Rev Ed) s 4.
6 Re BKR [2013] 4 SLR 1257 at [71]; Re F [2009] EWHC B30 (Fam) at [21].
7 Mental Capacity Act (Cap 177A, 2010 Rev Ed) s 4. The impairment must have a 
causal nexus to the functional inability and not merely be present or related to it: see 
York City Council v C [2014] 2 WLR 1; [2013] EWCA Civ 478.
8 BUV v BUU [2019] SGHCF 15 at [62].
9 BUV v BUU [2019] SGHCF 15 at [75].
10 BUV v BUU [2019] SGHCF 15 at [70].
11 BUV v BUU [2019] SGHCF 15 at [40].
12 BUV v BUU [2019] SGHCF 15 at [41]. In this regard, the Court of Appeal in Re BKR 
[2015] 4 SLR 84 had suggested a more inquisitorial and less adversarial mode of 
proceedings with the court directing the inquiry with inputs from independent 
experts; see also Cheshire West and Chester Council v P [2011] EWHC 1330 (Fam) 
at [52], per Baker J.
13 BUV v BUU [2019] SGHCF 15 at [48].
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executed, the events central to the court proceedings or relationships 
with her own children.14
9 Abdullah J stated that based on the cross-examination and 
medical evidence, the second defendant had an “impairment or 
disturbance in the functioning of the mind”.15 His Honour proceeded to 
add in the same paragraph that the mental impairment “manifested” in 
UWP’s “inability to recall short-term information, and an impairment 
in her ability to use and understand information”.16 Here it seems the 
analysis of the functional component overlaps with the clinical.
10 It is inevitable that certain mental abilities and sources of evidence 
may overlap for both components. In Re BKR,17 the Singapore Court 
of Appeal opined that the clinical aspect is an inquiry which requires 
evidence from medical experts as to the nature of mental impairment 
and its effect on P’s cognitive abilities, whilst the functional inability to 
make a decision is to be primarily assessed by the court based on the 
functional components in the MCA rather than by medical experts.18 
Reference was made to the clinical interviews and cross-examination 
of witnesses including P for the purpose of assessing the clinical and 
functional components.19
11 From a conceptual angle, however, the different objects of 
inquiry with respect to the clinical and functional components should, as 
far as possible, be separated at least in so far as clinical and professional 
assessments of mental incapacity are concerned.20 First, the mental 
impairment requirement was included to pre-empt the problem of over-
inclusiveness if it were to be based on the functional component alone.21 
Second, persons who suffer from mental impairment may nevertheless 
be able to make decisions with respect to their personal welfare or 
financial affairs22 or other decisions. Conversely, a person who is unable 
to understand or weigh information for a particular decision may not 
be suffering from any mental impairment. Third, as the assessment 
14 BUV v BUU [2019] SGHCF 15 at [45] and [48].
15 BUV v BUU [2019] SGHCF 15 at [75].
16 BUV v BUU [2019] SGHCF 15 at [75].
17 [2015] 4 SLR 81.
18 Re BKR [2015] 4 SLR 81 at [134]; see also the English position in King’s College 
Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v C [2015] EWCOP 80 at [39], per McDonald J; and 
CC v KK [2012] EWCOP 2136.
19 Re BKR [2015] 4 SLR 81 at [135].
20 York City Council v C [2014] 2 WLR 1; [2013] EWCA Civ 478 at [58].
21 See United Kingdom, Law Commission No 231, “Mental Incapacity” (1995) 
at para 3.8 (“ensuring that the test [for mental incapacity] is stringent enough not to 
catch large numbers of people who make unusual or unwise decisions”).
22 Eg, Re GAV [2014] SGDC 215.
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of mental capacity in the MCA requires a causal nexus between the 
clinical and functional components, there should be a clear method to 
differentiate the objects of inquiry for each component. The effect of 
mental impairment on functional ability may differ depending on the 
nature and severity of the specific mental impairment.
12 Mental impairment includes recognised mental illnesses such 
as depression and schizophrenia, brain injury, or mental impairment 
arising from alcohol or drug abuse.23 The impairment may be temporary 
or permanent in nature. The relevant evidence for establishing mental 
impairment may include brain scans, symptoms suggesting mental 
impairment and P’s responses to clinical interviews. In clinical diagnosis, 
reference is often made to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders24 (“DSM-IV”) and “International Classification of 
Diseases”25 (“ICD-10”) on the requisite symptoms which may include 
delusions, deterioration of memory and so on. With respect to dementia, 
the DSM-IV provides specific diagnostic criteria based on symptoms, 
significance of impairment or decline in functioning which may or may 
not overlap with the functional component set out in the MCA.26 The 
MCA does not provide guidelines for determining mental impairment 
unlike for functional ability. The assessment of functional ability must be 
made with reference to the legal provisions in ss 3(3), 3(4) and 5 of the 
MCA.
23 World Health Organization, “International Statistical Classification of Diseases 
and Related Health Problems” (10th Revision, 5th Ed, 2016) ch 5 on mental and 
behavioural disorders: ICD codes F00 to F99.
24 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (Washington DC, American Medical Association, 1994).
25 World Health Organization, “International Statistical Classification of Diseases and 
Related Health Problems (10th Revision, 5th Ed, 2016).
26 American Psychiatric Association,  Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (Washington DC, American Medical Association, 1994). The section on 
“Diagnostic Criteria for Dementia of the Alzheimer’s Type” states as follows:
A. The development of multiple cognitive deficits manifested by both:
(1) memory impairment (impaired ability to learn new information or 
to recall previously learned information)
(2) one (or more) of the following cognitive disturbances:
(a) aphasia (language disturbance)
(b) apraxia (impaired ability to carry out motor activities despite 
intact motor function)
(c) agnosia (failure to recognize or identify objects despite intact 
sensory function)
(d) disturbance in executive function (i.e. planning, organizing, 
sequencing, abstracting)
B. The cognitive deficits in Criteria A1 and A2 each cause significant 
impairment in social or occupational functioning and represent a significant 
decline from a previous level of functioning.
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13 As for clinical interviews and cognitive tests, it is suggested 
that they may be used for determining both functional and clinical 
components. One material difference is that the clinical aspect is primarily 
based on medical expert evidence whilst the functional aspects are to 
be decided by judges. The interviews and tests allow medical experts to 
ascertain the nature of the impairment and its effect on cognitive abilities 
based on diagnostic criteria for the specific impairment. Similarly, judges 
can draw from the interviews and cognitive tests to assess whether they 
correspond with the functional components of understanding, retention, 
use and weighing of information and communication of decision.
14 The closer the clinical interviews and cognitive tests are 
conducted to the time of execution of the legal documents, the greater 
their evidential weight for assessing P’s mental capacity. Whether such 
evidence would be useful in a particular case would also depend on the 
nature of the questions asked during the interviews and the types of 
cognitive tests conducted and their connection to the particular decision 
made by P. In the present case, Abdullah  J considered a few cognitive 
tests, namely, Mini Mental State Exam (“MMSE”), Frontal Assessment 
Battery (“FAB”) test, the CLOX clock-drawing test, and finally, the 
Abbreviated Mental Test (“AMT”). In Re BKR,27 the Court of Appeal had 
raised questions as to whether the cognitive tests, in particular the clock-
drawing test, related to a person’s ability to make decisions in actual life 
situations.
15 In order to aid the court in assessing mental capacity, one proposal 
is for the cognitive tests to be more geared towards the four elements 
of functional (in)ability to make a decision, provided the assessments 
are also linked to the type of decision made by P. In this regard, the 
MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool for Treatment,28 for example, 
uses the four aspects of mental capacity in s 5 of the MCA (though, as the 
name suggests, it is primarily meant for assessing the patient’s consent to 
treatment) and the FACE Mental Capacity Assessment was devised for 
clinicians applying the MCA test.29
27 [2015] 4 SLR 81 at [146].
28 Thomas Grisso, Paul S Appelbaum & Carolyn Hill-Fotouhi, “The MacCAT-T: 
A Clinical Tool to Assess Patients’ Capacities to Make Treatment Decisions” (1997) 
48(11) Psychiatric Services 1415.
29 Sumytra Menon, “The Mental Capacity Act: Implications for Patients and Doctors 
Faced with Difficult Choices” Annals Academy of Medicine (April 2013).
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III. Mental incapacity to execute legal documents
16 The assessment of mental capacity is issue-specific. Depending 
on the situation and evidence, P  may be adjudged to have the mental 
capacity to make certain decisions but not others.30 With respect to the 
revocation issue, both medical experts were of the view that she had 
the mental capacity to create the LPA.31 One of them gave evidence that 
UWP did not have the mental capacity to make the will as UWP could 
neither remember the assets that she wanted to include in the will nor the 
executor and beneficiaries of the will.32
17 The learned judge found, however, that UWP lacked mental 
capacity to execute both legal documents. As mentioned above, his 
Honour found there was impairment or disturbance in the functioning 
of her mind and UWP was unable to recall short-term information or 
to use and understand information. In particular, she could not recall 
the circumstances surrounding the execution of the will during cross-
examination33 and there was no further evidence apart from the fact 
that she had been independently advised as to the will.34 Moreover, the 
lawyer’s evidence as to UWP’s mental capacity to execute the LPA was 
not conclusive as he was not aware of UWP’s diagnosis of dementia and 
was not medically trained to assess mental capacity.35
18 Ultimately, a judge must be prepared in appropriate cases 
to depart from the clinical view of medical experts which may not be 
based on the precise functional components in assessing mental capacity 
under the MCA. This supports the “social model” of mental impairment 
(which understands the experience of disability from the perspective 
of social context, structures and institutions) as opposed to the strictly 
“medicalised” view (that the impairment is a purely medical disorder 
associated with a particular individual).36 Important as the mental 
impairment requirement is to prevent over-inclusiveness of the category 
30 Eg, A NHS Trust v X [2014] EWCOP 35.
31 BUV v BUU [2019] SGHCF 15 at [63]–[64].
32 BUV v BUU [2019] SGHCF 15 at [84].
33 BUV v BUU [2019] SGHCF 15 at [81].
34 BUV v BUU [2019] SGHCF 15 at [83].
35 BUV v BUU [2019] SGHCF 15 at [79].
36 B Clough, “‘People Like That’: Realising the Social Model in Mental Capacity 
Jurisprudence” (2015) 23(1) Medical Law Review 53–80; see also reference to 
DH NHS Foundation Trust v PS [2010] EWHC 1217 (Fam) at [3] in n 22 of B Clough 
above (suggesting that adopting the “medicalised” perspective may lead a judge to 
accept the clinical diagnosis of mental illness without scrutinising the functional 
elements).
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of persons with mental incapacity as mentioned above,37 the concept of 
mental incapacity is broader than mental impairment per se. Overall, 
as the clinical diagnosis is primarily based on medical expert opinion, 
the MCA framework may be seen as accommodating both (clinical and 
functional) perspectives in the assessment of mental capacity.
19 Let us now examine the four elements of functional ability 
to make a decision.38 With respect to understanding the relevant 
information, it is suggested that this should involve an appreciation of 
the purpose(s) or reason(s), nature, consequence(s) of the decision to 
be taken and the option(s) available.39 The nature of the decision may, 
such as in the present case, involve an understanding of the contents 
of the legal document (such as a will or the LPA). For retention of 
information, one important aspect would be the duration. The ability to 
retain information for only a short duration does not necessarily mean 
P does not have functional ability to make a decision.40 The Code of 
Practice under the MCA41 (“Code of Practice”) states that “it is sufficient 
if the person remembers the information for a short period of time as 
long as he can remember it long enough to understand it, weigh it up 
and communicate his decision”.42 With regard to assessing P’s use and 
weighing of information, it is focused on the process not outcomes.43 In 
the Code of Practice,44 the example used to illustrate the use and weighing 
up of information for treatment appears to indicate that the person’s 
beliefs (based on subjective perceptions) may be taken into account in 
assessing mental capacity:
Li Ling has been diagnosed with schizophrenia. She cut her hand but refuses 
to allow her family to attend to the wound because she is experiencing 
hallucinations and paranoia that causes her to believe that her family members 
37 See United Kingdom, Law Commission No 231, “Mental Incapacity” (1995) 
at para 3.8 (“ensuring that the test [for mental incapacity] is stringent enough not to 
catch large numbers of people who make unusual or unwise decisions”).
38 See Alex Ruck Keene et al, “Taking Capacity Seriously? Ten Years of Mental Capacity 
Disputes Before England’s Court of Protection” (2019) 62 International Journal of 
Law and Psychiatry 56 especially at 66–70.
39 This is consistent with the Code of Practice at <https://www.msf.gov.sg/opg/Pages/
Home.aspx> (accessed 26 July 2019) (hereinafter “Code of Practice”) at para 4.6.1.
40 Mental Capacity Act (Cap 177A, 2010 Rev Ed) s 5(3).
41 See Code of Practice.
42 Code of Practice at para 4.6.2.
43 M J Gunn, et al, “Decision-making Capacity” (1997) 7(3) Medical Law Review 269 
at 297. This emphasis on process rather than outcomes is also supported by s 3(4) of 
the Mental Capacity Act (Cap 177A, 2010 Rev Ed) which states that “[a] person is 
not to be treated as unable to make a decision merely because he makes an unwise 
decision”.
44 The Code of Practice is not meant to represent the law but provide guidance to 
people when dealing with persons lacking mental capacity.
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are plotting to harm her. She is unable to accept anything they say to her about 
the nature of her wound and the treatment they wish to administer.
 An informal assessment of Li Ling’s capacity shows that she is unable 
to use or weigh the information to make a decision about whether to accept or 
reject the treatment.
20 Citing Re BKR, the judgment also briefly mentioned “executive 
function” which includes activities such as planning, organising and 
even the ability to think abstractly when examining the relevance of 
the cognitive tests.45 Indeed, one of the aspects of the clinical diagnosis 
for dementia in DSM-IV is the “disturbance in executive function 
(i.e.  planning, organizing, sequencing, abstracting)”. As for the 
functional aspects, one would probably require a sufficient threshold of 
understanding and retention of the information before one can exercise 
executive function. It is likely that the need to show “executive function” 
as part of the functional component would depend on the context 
(eg, where it involves a decision requiring wide-ranging ability to manage 
significant financial wealth and assets). In the case of a decision that is 
less complex (eg, to execute a LPA in favour of a donee whom the donor 
trusts), however, it is not intuitive that the ability to weigh information 
in the MCA would necessarily encompass the capacity to “plan” (which 
typically requires the ability to consider timelines and possible future 
effects of one’s actions) or to think “abstractedly” (about general categories 
of things and hypothetical situations).
21 The more complex the decision, the more capacity is required. 
Expert evidence in the present case differed on the mental capacity 
required to execute the LPA and will. As mentioned, the assessment of 
mental capacity is issue-specific (or more precisely, document-specific). 
Assessing the content of the “relevant information” for a particular 
decision is crucial.46 Thus, the functional ability should be analysed 
by reference to the nature, purpose and consequences of making the 
decision whether with respect to the will or LPA (and this will be further 
discussed below).
22 As a brief aside to the issue-specific assessment of mental 
capacity, Abdullah J’s assessment of UWP’s lack of mental capacity led to 
his Honour concluding that she was not capable of conducting litigation.47 
It would be useful to assess UWP’s mental capacity by reference to the 
functional components for a specific decision to be made by P. The test 
45 BUV v BUU [2019] SGHCF 15 at [52].
46 LBL v RYJ [2011] 1 FLR 1279; In re A (Court of Protection) [2019] 3 WLR 59 
(in relation to social media and Internet usage).
47 BUV v BUU [2019] SGHCF 15 at [25].
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in Masterman-Lister v Brutton & Co and Jewell & Home Counties Dairie48 
is whether the party to legal proceedings was capable of understanding, 
with the assistance of such proper explanation from legal advisers and 
experts in other disciplines as the case might require, the issues on which 
his consent or decision was likely to be necessary in the course of those 
proceedings. This common law test is consistent with and also helps to 
contextualise the first functional element (namely P’s “understanding” of 
the information relevant to the decision) in relation to the specific mental 
capacity to conduct litigation. If this test were to be accepted by the 
court, the conclusion that UWP was not mentally capable of conducting 
litigation may be determined by reference to UWP’s absence of knowledge 
with respect to the substantive issues in the court proceedings, namely, 
the moneys in the bank account (which the learned judge had alluded 
to),49 the significance of appointing court deputies and the status of the 
legal documents she executed.50 These factors should also be interpreted 
as far as possible in accordance with the scope of “information relevant 
to a decision” in s 5(4) of the MCA.51
IV. Facilitative assistance to P to make decisions
23 Section 3 of the MCA lays out a few basic principles relating to 
the presumption of mental capacity. For example, s 3(3) of the MCA states 
that “a person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision unless 
all practicable steps to help him do so have been taken without success”. 
Abdullah J aptly referred to s 3(3) as importing “facilitative assistance” 
that enables a person to make a decision.52 Read with s 5(2) which states 
that the relevant information may have to be “explained in a way that is 
appropriate to the person’s circumstances (using simple language, visual 
aids or any other means)”, his Honour stated that s  3(3) is “aimed at 
helping a person retain her existing decision-making ability” – a clearly 
important objective. The learned judge also highlighted that the assistance 
does not obviate the need for a base level of decision-making capacity.53 
Apart from these judicial observations, another objective of s 3(3) could 
be to help P demonstrate her decision-making ability in circumstances 
48 [2003] 1 WLR 1511.
49 In BUV v BUU [2019] SGHCF 15, Aedit Abdullah J indicated at [49], with reference 
to one set of court proceedings in OS 1096/2016, that UWP’s “decision-making in 
respect of her funds was compromised”.
50 In BUV v BUU [2019] SGHCF 15, Aedit Abdullah J at [86]–[87] did not find the 
testimony of the lawyers useful to assess P’s mental capacity for execution of the 
lasting power of attorney and will.
51 This refers to “information about the reasonably foreseeable consequences of – 
(a) deciding one way of another; or (b) failing to make the decision”.
52 BUV v BUU [2019] SGHCF 15 at [110].
53 BUV v BUU [2019] SGHCF 15 at [88].
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where a third party alleges that P lacks the ability to understand, use or 
weigh the information based on the available evidence (for example, 
that P failed to respond to a specific question posed to test her decision-
making ability). In such circumstances, the question put to P to assess 
his ability to make a rather complex decision may have to be re-crafted 
in simple language so that P can respond accordingly to demonstrate that 
he does possess the requisite decision-making ability for the purpose of 
rebutting the allegations. Beyond “decision-making ability”, it is also clear 
that the principle in s 3(3) should extend to the functional component of 
P’s (in)ability to communicate her decision in s 5(1)(d) (though this was 
not directly relevant to the case facts).
24 One of the medical professionals administering the cognitive 
tests had allowed UWP the use of paper when she was doing simple 
subtraction during the AMTs as she was “struggling”.54 The plaintiff 
argued that such assistance by the medical professional would bias 
the results. Abdullah  J disagreed, noting perceptively that the medical 
professional did not coach or guide UWP in the answers.55 On the facts, 
the learned judge noted that UWP’s inability to understand and retain 
information was such that facilitative assistance would not have helped 
UWP in any event to make decisions.
25 According to the Code of Practice, a “person-centred approach” 
that focuses on P’s best interests, should be adopted to help him or her 
make decisions.56 When communicating with persons who may have 
mental capacity issues, the approach should be tailored to their needs 
(eg, their educational level and specific intellectual disabilities). Factors 
to consider include the speed and manner in which the information is 
presented, use of supplementary materials (eg, picture boards, DVDs and 
leaflets) as appropriate, cultural and religious sensitivities and the need 
for an interpreter. The Code of Practice gives an example of a person with 
learning disabilities in absorbing verbal information. In such a situation, 
the suggestion was to present the information in other ways such as in 
drawings or actions to help him understand the information.57
26 There was no specific mention of the language or alternative 
methods (such as the use of pictures and drawings) to communicate with 
UWP during the clinical interviews since she was illiterate and could only 
speak the Teochew dialect though one of the cognitive tests administered 
54 BUV v BUU [2019] SGHCF 15 at [73].
55 Re BKR [2013] 4 SLR 1257 at [73].
56 Code of Practice at para 5.2. This includes listening carefully to them, truly seeking 
to understand what the person wants, and finding appropriate ways to support the 
person’s decision-making.
57 Code of Practice at para 4.6.1.
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by the medical professionals did take into consideration UWP’s age and 
low education in the scoring.58
V. Impact of undue influence on mental capacity and the lasting 
power of attorney
27 Though s  4 of the MCA refers to the causal nexus between a 
person’s inability to make decisions (functional component) and mental 
impairment (clinical), it is not the sole nexus. The concept of “effective” 
cause which applies to s 4 does not mean that mental impairment must 
be the only cause for the inability to make decisions.59 The functional 
inability to make decisions may be caused by the individual’s mental 
impairment as well as actual circumstances such as undue influence 
exerted on the individual.
28 Recently, the Singapore Court of Appeal decision in BOM v 
BOK60 focused on classes of actual (class 1) and presumed (class 2) undue 
influence with respect to the execution of a deed of trust. It accepted that 
a lack of mental capacity flowing from acute grief from bereavement over 
the death of a loved one61 as well as bullying, pressure and threats by 
another can result in a person being subject to actual undue influence. 
It should be noted, however, that the case did not directly examine the 
MCA requirements or the clinical and functional components of mental 
capacity.
29 The central question is whether and how undue influence impacts 
on the issue of mental capacity under the MCA. Abdullah J had referred to 
the Court of Appeal’s statement in Re BKR62 that undue influence may be 
relevant in three ways: (a) whether the person is capable of understanding 
that a third party is opposed to his interests or if that inability is caused 
by mental impairment; (b) whether the person’s susceptibility to undue 
influence is caused by mental impairment; and (c) whether the person is 
unable to obtain assistance in making decisions due to undue influence. 
This reinforces the contextual nature of the inquiry on mental capacity. 
The learned judge observed that UWP’s mental impairment affected her 
ability to discern whether undue influence was exerted on her, made 
58 BUV v BUU [2019] SGHCF 15 at [55].
59 Re BKR [2015] 4 SLR 81 at [115].
60 [2019] 1 SLR 349.
61 The husband who executed the deed of trust was suffering from acute grief from his 
mother’s death which impaired his judgment at the material time. But there was no 
discussion of the Mental Capacity Act (Cap 177A, 2010 Rev Ed) requirements or the 
clinical and functional components of mental capacity.
62 Re BKR [2015] 4 SLR 81 at [125]–[126].
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her more susceptible to undue influence and resulted in her inability to 
receive assistance.63
30 With regard to point (a) above, one question to be raised is 
the significance of P’s understanding that a third party is opposed to 
his interests for the purpose of assessing mental capacity. As discussed, 
understanding information relevant to a decision involves an appreciation 
of the purpose(s), nature, option(s) and consequence(s) of making the 
decision. In this regard, undue influence would not typically affect P’s 
understanding of the purpose or nature of the decision but may mislead 
P into thinking that he or she does not have a viable alternative. Point (b) 
above is relevant to the causal nexus between mental impairment and 
functional inability to make a decision. Point (c) would be relevant to the 
interpretation and application of s 3(3) of the MCA as discussed above. 
The court has to strike a balance between the practical steps needed 
to facilitate the rendering of assistance to P and consider how undue 
influence might prevent P from obtaining such assistance.
31 The Singapore High Court in the present case decided that there 
was a rebuttable presumption of undue influence under class 2B where 
there is a “relationship of trust and confidence” between the parties that 
falls outside certain established legal categories,64 and the transaction is 
not readily explicable by their relationship as stated in Oversea-Chinese 
Banking Corp Ltd v Tan Teck Khong.65 In similar vein, UWP reposed 
“a great of deal of trust and confidence” in the first defendant, and she 
was “dependent and vulnerable beyond a normal degree” due to her age 
and mental condition.66 The circumstances under which UWP signed 
the legal documents, her lack of knowledge of the contents, and the first 
defendant’s instructions and presence during these events gave rise to 
the presumption of undue influence. The evidence adduced that UWP 
may have favoured and approved of the first defendant’s actions was not 
sufficient to rebut the presumption.
32 The High Court felt empowered to revoke the LPA under s 17 of 
the MCA67 on the basis that “undue pressure” from the first defendant 
63 BUV v BUU [2019] SGHCF 15 at [108].
64 This is class 2A presumed undue influence. The categories of wrongdoer and 
complainant respectively are parent and child, solicitor and client, medical adviser 
and patient.
65 [2005] 2 SLR(R) 694 at [34]. This case involved a class 2B presumption of undue 
influence. One material difference is that the person executing the mortgage was not 
mentally incapable of making the decision.
66 BUV v BUU [2019] SGHCF 15 at [93].
67 Mental Capacity Act (Cap 177A, 2010 Rev Ed) s 17(4)(b) (“[t]he court may … if P 
lacks capacity to do so, revoke the instrument or the lasting power of attorney”) read 
(cont’d on the next page)
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had induced the donor (UWP) to create the LPA. In the English case 
of The Public Guardian v GB, SG, London Borough of Bromley,68 the 
presumption of undue influence by the donees of an LPA appeared to be 
a factor underlying the court’s conclusion that the LPA made by P should 
be revoked on the ground that the donees had behaved in a way that 
contravened their authority and which was not in P’s best interest.69 In a 
different context, the presence of undue influence exerted on a person is 
a factor to consider when granting a statutory will under the MCA.70 In a 
statutory will, the court steps into the shoes of the person and attempts to 
walk in it by executing a will that protects the person’s best interests. In a 
previous case, the exercise of undue influence (ie, actual undue influence) 
exerted on P who suffered from dementia went towards showing that the 
testator’s will was not freely executed and did not serve her best interests; 
as such, the court was prepared to grant a statutory will.71
33 Abdullah J’s decision implied that, with respect to the LPA, 
“undue pressure” in s 17 of the MCA can encompass presumed undue 
influence.72 One problem is the literal phrasing of the section that “undue 
pressure was used to induce P to create a lasting power of attorney”. This 
may suggest that steps must be taken by the third party to put pressure on 
or coerce P to create the LPA. If this interpretation is accepted, it would 
imply that the revocation of an LPA requires actual rather than merely 
presumed undue influence. If so, evidence of a relationship of trust and 
confidence between P and the third party and that the execution of the 
legal document is one that calls for an explanation would not suffice.
34 It must, however, be highlighted that actual and presumed undue 
influence are not different types of undue influence but different ways of 
proving undue influence.73 The legal burden lies with the party claiming 
undue influence, and presumed undue influence involves a shift of 
merely the evidential, and not the legal, burden. In fact, it can be argued 
with s 17(3)(a)(ii) (where undue pressure was used to induce P to create a lasting 
power of attorney).
68 [2015] EWCOP 6.
69 Mental Capacity Act 2005 (c 9) (UK) s 22(3)(b).
70 Mental Capacity Act (Cap 177A, 2010 Rev Ed) s 23(1)(i).
71 TCZ v TDA; TDB v TDC [2015] SGFC 63. See also BHR v BHS [2013] SGDC 149 
at [63] (P who suffered from dementia lacked testamentary capacity; the statutory 
will was granted on the basis of, amongst others, undue influence of P).
72 The terms “undue influence” and “undue pressure” appear to be used interchangeably: 
see Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (14 March 2016), vol  94 on 
the Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill. Note, however, that the Advance Medical 
Directive Act (Cap 4A, 1997 Rev Ed) uses the term “undue influence” in s 14(1)(a).
73 Andrew Phang Boon Leong & Goh Yihan, “Duress, Undue Influence and 
Unconscionability” in The Law of Contract in Singapore (Andrew Phang Boon Leong 
gen ed) (Academy Publishing, 2012) at para 12.114.
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that the distinction between actual (class  1) and presumed (class  2B) 
undue influence is blurred as “the proof of facts that raise an evidential 
presumption would simultaneously constitute the proof of actual undue 
influence”.74 Further, the discussion in Re BKR above on the three ways 
that undue influence may be relevant to mental capacity does not make 
any distinction between actual or presumed undue influence. Based on 
the aforementioned observation, presumed undue influence (in addition 
to actual undue influence) may be regarded as a method to show that 
undue pressure “was used” to induce P. After all, the undue pressure may 
either be explicit or implicit under the statutory provision.
35 Moreover, the MCA seeks to protect the donor of an LPA who 
may be particularly vulnerable vis-à-vis the donee as a matter of policy 
and this is consistent with the objective of the equitable doctrine of undue 
influence (actual and presumed) to prevent victimisation.75 For example, 
the 2016 amendments to the MCA added to the court’s powers to revoke 
the LPA if there is a risk of abuse of the vulnerable donor by the donee 
who has been convicted of an offence involving dishonesty or fraud.76 
Allowing greater leeway for the use of undue influence to be proven 
(whether through actual or presumed undue influence) would better 
protect the autonomy of the donor.
VI. Undue influence and testamentary capacity at common law
36 In deciding to revoke the will, Abdullah J referred to the case of 
Chee Mu Lin Muriel v Chee Ka Lin Caroline77 (“Chee Mu Lin Muriel”) in 
which it was held that mental capacity under ss 4 and 5 of the MCA is 
consistent with the common principles relating to testamentary capacity. 
As stated in Chee Mu Lin Muriel,78 the legal requirements of testamentary 
capacity are as follows: (a) the testator understands the nature of the act 
74 Andrew Phang & Hans Tjio, “The Uncertain Boundaries of Undue Influence” [2002] 
LMCLQ 231 at 232–233.
75 Allcard v Skinner (1887) 36 Ch D 145 at 182–183; National Westminster Bank plc v 
Morgan [1985] AC 686 at 705.
76 See Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (14 March 2016), vol  94 on 
the Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill, where the Minister for Social and Family 
Development stated that the:
… amendments will allow the Court to revoke a donee’s or deputy’s powers 
if there is significant risk of the donee or deputy abusing the person whom they 
have been appointed for. For instance, the risk of abuse would be significant, if 
the donee or deputy is convicted of an offence involving dishonesty or fraud. 
This offence could have been committed against some other person, and not 
simply just the donor. However, the donor has no capacity. He is vulnerable. 
[emphasis added]
77 [2010] 4 SLR 373.
78 Chee Mu Lin Muriel v Chee Ka Lin Caroline [2010] 4 SLR 373 at [37].
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and its consequences;79 (b) he knows the extent of the property of which 
he is disposing; (c) he knows who his beneficiaries are and can appreciate 
their claims to the property; and (d) he is free from an abnormal state 
of mind that might distort feelings or judgments relevant to making the 
will.80
37 The finding of a mental illness per se does not mean that the 
testator did not possess testamentary capacity.81 If the testator was 
suffering from mental illness prior to the execution of the will that results 
in loss of testamentary capacity, there is a presumption of continued 
lack of testamentary capacity at the time of execution. But such a 
presumption can be rebutted if it is shown that there were moments of 
lucidity demonstrating testamentary capacity at the time of execution 
despite the testator suffering from dementia.82 The assessment of 
testamentary capacity is a decision for the judges based on both medical 
and non-medical evidence rather than the medical experts. Similarly, 
as mentioned above, under ss  4 and 5 of the MCA, both clinical and 
functional components together determine the issue of mental capacity.83
38 The similarities between testamentary capacity and mental 
capacity under the MCA are that they are both time-specific and issue-
specific.84 However, there is arguably a material difference relating to 
undue influence. The learned judge had made a connection between 
testamentary capacity and the validity of a will by drawing from Chee Mu 
Lin Muriel.85 To establish the validity of a will, the testator must (a) have 
the mental capacity to make a will; (b) have the knowledge and approval 
of the contents of the will; and (c) be free of undue influence or the effects 
of fraud. In this regard, His Honour noted that the testator (UWP) was 
not mentally capable at the time of the signing of the will and was also 
under undue influence from the first defendant. This means that undue 
influence was clearly a factor underlying the judge’s decision to revoke 
the will. From the discussion in the preceding section, this is a class 2B 
presumed undue influence.
79 Sheffield City Council v E & S [2004] EWHC 2808 (Fam), per Munby J (that the test 
of capacity is the ability (whether or not one chooses to exercise it) to understand the 
nature and quality of the transaction).
80 Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549 at 565 (cited in George Abraham Vadakathu v 
Jacob George [2009] 3 SLR(R) 631 at [29]).
81 Chee Mu Lin Muriel v Chee Ka Lin Caroline [2010] 4 SLR 373 at [42].
82 Chee Mu Lin Muriel v Chee Ka Lin Caroline [2010] 4 SLR 373 at [41].
83 Chee Mu Lin Muriel v Chee Ka Lin Caroline [2010] 4 SLR 373 at [45].
84 George Abraham Vadakathu v Jacob George [2009] 3 SLR(R) 631 (capacity to make 
a will at a certain time though testator may not have had capacity to make a will at 
another time; and the capacity needed to make a complex will is not the same as that 
needed to make a simple will.)
85 Chee Mu Lin Muriel v Chee Ka Lin Caroline [2010] 4 SLR 373 at [37].
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39 Based on recent case law, however, the common law position 
on wills appears to be that the undue influence required to invalidate a 
will has to be actual; presumed undue influence does not suffice.86 This 
position is also supported by legal commentaries on wills.87 The focus is 
arguably on the element of “coercion” in undue influence with respect to 
wills; mere persuasion and influence is not sufficient.88 As such, whilst 
presumed undue influence can adversely affect one’s mental capacity to 
make a decision generally, it seems that the same concept cannot apply to 
invalidate a will.
40 This in turn raises the question whether the statutory position 
with regard to LPAs under the MCA as discussed in the preceding section 
should be consistent with the common law position on revocation of 
wills. As a starting point, a broader treatment of undue influence (actual 
and presumed) as argued in the preceding section would better protect 
the autonomy of both donors of LPAs and testators in the making of a 
will at common law. However, it is understandable that the two positions 
need not be perfectly aligned. The principles relating to the invalidation of 
wills based on coercion are part of a regime that has developed separately 
from the equitable doctrine of undue influence as applied to contracts 
(and for that matter, LPAs under the statute). There is special protection 
given to donors of LPAs who are vulnerable under the MCA whilst the 
policy of preventing victimisation is not so strong in respect of testators 
and wills. In this regard, the Wills Act89 focuses on the formalities of 
execution and does not specifically protect the testator from undue 
pressure or influence from third parties, and the local case precedents on 
testamentary capacity have yet to engage on the relevance of this policy 
issue at common law. As it stands, this may signal a difference in statutory 
objectives for LPAs and wills respectively. Also, there is arguably greater 
impact on the donor flowing from the creation of an LPA as it gives the 
donee continuing decision-making powers with respect to the donor’s 
personal matters and financial affairs when the donor has become 
mentally incapable of making such decisions, unlike in the case of wills. 
That being said, the MCA framework allows for a measure of control 
86 ULV v ULW [2019] 3 SLR 1270 at [69]–[71]. See also Rajaratnam Kumar v Estate of 
Rajaratnam Saravana Muthu (deceased) [2010] 4 SLR 93 at [65]; Lian Kok Hong v 
Lian Bee Leng [2015] SGHC 205 at [45] and the Court of Appeal decision in Lian Kok 
Hong v Lian Bee Leng [2016] 3 SLR 405 at [38]. Cf the more dated Tan Teck Khong v 
Tan Pian Meng [2002] 2 SLR(R) 490 which accepted in general the presumption of 
undue influence in respect of wills and transactions.
87 Theobald on Wills (John G Ross Martyn et al eds) (Sweet & Maxwell, 18th Ed, 2016) 
at para 3.032; Roger Kerridge, Parry & Kerridge: The Law of Succession (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 13th Ed, 2016) at para 5.54; Halsbury’s Law of Singapore vol 15 (LexisNexis, 
2016 Reissue) at para 190.199 (all cited in ULV v ULW [2010] 3 SLR 1270 at [69]).
88 ULV v ULW [2010] 3 SLR 1270 at [71].
89 Cap 352, 1996 Rev Ed.
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over the donees of LPAs by prescribing the substantive requirements of 
determining P’s “best interests”90 when she becomes mentally incapable 
and by instituting further safeguards by the Office of Public Guardian 
constituted and exercising its powers under the statute against errant 
donees.91
VII. Conclusion
41 The assessment of P’s mental capacity or otherwise is central 
to the MCA framework. It is proposed that the clinical and functional 
analyses of mental capacity ought to be delineated more clearly so as 
to be consistent with their treatment under the MCA framework. The 
components of the functional inability to make a decision (especially the 
scope of understanding, using and weighing of relevant information) 
should be separately analysed as far as possible with respect to each 
specific decision to be made by P. The judicial reference to “facilitative 
assistance” provided to P and the objective to allow P to “retain” his 
decision-making ability under s 3(3) are useful though its scope could 
be widened. Clarifications regarding the impact of actual (or presumed) 
undue influence on mental capacity and its effect on the issue of whether 
the LPA or will ought to be revoked will also be important.
90 Mental Capacity Act (Cap 177A, 2010 Rev Ed) s 6.
91 See ss 30–32 of the Mental Capacity Act (Cap 177A, 2010 Rev Ed). The Office of 
Public Guardian receives reports from the donees and has the power to investigate 
any statutory contravention.
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